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Corporations and individuals continue to be under Phishing attack. Researchers categorizes 
methods corporations and individuals can employ to reduce the impact of being caught in a 
Phishing scheme. Corporation enable technical mechanisms such as automated filtering, URL 
blacklisting, and manipulation of browser warning messages to reduce phishing susceptibility 
costing billions of dollars annually. However, even with robust efforts to educate employees about 
phishing techniques through security awareness training the abundance of attacks continues to 
plague organizations. This study aims to identify whether a correlation exists between mindfulness 
and phishing susceptibility. The goal of this research is to determine if mindful individuals are less 
susceptible to phishing. By showing individuals with increased awareness are significantly able to 
identify areas that phishing attempts exploit.  
Based on a review of the literature a misconception exists between end-users, corporation and 
Internet Service Providers (ISP) regarding ownership of Phishing identification. Specifically, 
individuals blame ISPs and corporate information technology departments for failing to protect 
them from Phishing attacks. Still, the truth of the matter is that the end-user is ultimately the 
weakest link in the phishing identification chain. The methodology of this study polled participants 
through initial screening focusing on whether the individuals were mindful using the Mindful 
Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) survey. Conclusions seen in this study in contrast with other 
studies saw no significant correlation between Mindfulness and phishing susceptibility, increase in 
cogitative ability or increase in Phishing identification. Thus, continued use of MAAS survey 
questionnaire is necessary to screen other groups for phishing awareness prior to focusing on other 
phishing cues.  
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Chapter 1 
 
Introduction 
 
 
 
 Background 
Despite the abundance of warnings and corporate security awareness training users against 
unsafe information security behavior, these “educated” users continue to click on embedded links from 
known and sometimes unknown email senders. Initial indications from the reviews of the literature 
characterize phishing as a significant threat to individuals and organizations, phishing attacks alone 
represent a significant drain on the economy and a global problem (Wright, Jensen, Thatcher, Dinger, 
& Marett, 2014). The impact from phishing spans all industrialized counties resulting in organizations 
losing billions of dollars according to the (RSA, 2014). Furthermore, a recent report on the top twenty 
phishing targets, identified CIBC, Apple, Inc., PayPal, Google, and Yahoo as the top five, having a 
5,000% increase of attacks. 
The Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) customers reported over the last quarter of 2018, 
138,328 unique phishing web sites and 239,910 unique phishing email (campaigns). Meanwhile, the 
study by Ponemon Institute and Accenture (2017), identified 67% of companies had experienced some 
form of phishing and social engineering attack. While InfoWorld reported seeing 6.3 million phishing 
emails during the first quarter 2016. Accordingly, Abawajy (2014), and Hovav and Gray (2014), stated 
organizations had sustained significant cost and damage to their reputation due to the massive data 
breaches caused by internal employees. For example, in 2013, RSA reported 450,000 phishing attacks 
with estimated losses over $5.9 billion, although less than the estimated losses posit to exceed $1 
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trillion globally by Bose et al. (2008) as cited by Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang and Rao (2011). 
Furthermore, researchers continue to identify phishing as a major issue despite the extensive attention 
paid to technical solutions to combat phishing; organizations remain vulnerable to end-user behavior 
(Wright et al., 2014). 
Currently, 91% of known breaches are associated with a form of phishing attack (WIRED, 
n.d.) that can subject end users and organizations to malware and ransomware (CSO Online, n.d.) or 
other types of infections. CSO Online stresses 93% of phishing emails can cause infections from 
ransomware, that is up from the 80% of the 507 billion emails sent per day that are reported as spam, 
malware, or phishing according to Wright et al. (2014). Furthermore, a review of the literature depicts 
five of the top twenty phishing targets are CIBC, Apple, Inc., PayPal, Google, and Yahoo with a 
combined 5,000% increase in attacks. However, none of these targets are related to corporations but 
online access is potentially occurring using corporate infrastructure and assets.  
One example of a successful phishing attack occurred twice against The National Bank of 
Blacksburg which lost more than $569,000 in the incident (Krebs, 2018). In the first instance an 
employee fell victim to a targeted phishing email which allowed the intruder to install malware on the 
victim’s computer. This allow the intruder to compromise a second computer with access to the STAR 
Network, a system run by First Data that handles debit card transaction for customer. In the second 
breach eight months, the STAR Network was compromised again in addition to the bank’s Navigator 
system used to manage credits and debits to customer accounts. In another example against the 
taxpayers in the United States (U.S.). In 2014 the IRS reported a 66% increase in attacks on U.S. 
taxpayers and issued IR-2014-39 warning taxpayers about a new email phishing scheme (IRS, 2014). 
Phishers posing as IRS employees contacted taxpayers utilizing facial recognition messaging 
expressing “Your reported 2013 income is flagged for review due to a document processing error. 
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Your case has been forwarded to the Taxpayer Advocate Service for resolution assistance. To avoid 
delays processing your 2013 filing contact the Taxpayer Advocate Service for resolution assistance” 
(IRS, 2014, p. 1). Taxpayers’ that replied to this phishing request refunds vanished without a trace.  
Because of the high incidence of users’ falling for phishing schemes, organizations have 
increased spending on Information Security (IS) tools (e.g., black listing web sites, enhances browser 
warning messages, increased security awareness training, automated detection technology and hiring 
of cybersecurity professional) that impact administrative, physical, and technical controls used to 
affect employee information security compliant behavior (Ifinedo, 2012). Furthermore, most web 
browsers provide automated warning messages to alert individuals about issues identified in the email 
or embedded links. Despite these security measures, studies show that individuals spend a limited 
amount of time looking at warning messages and pay little attention to warning messages they do look 
at because few messages tell the user what to do to cure the problem (2014 Anderson, Kirwan, 
Jenkins, Eargle, Howard, and Vance, 2014; .Hoban et al., 2014). The frequency of the messages also 
plays a role as seen in the eye movement-based memory effect (EMM) study performed by Anderson 
et al. (2013), which affirms people are paying less attention to security images and browser warning 
messages they have previously viewed, resulting to a form of habituation and mindlessness activity. 
Regardless, even if the messages were heeded, these technological interventions alone cannot 
eliminate the threat from phishing since phishers operate within legitimate communication channels, 
making it difficult for individuals to effectively distinguish between genuine messages and phishing 
messages (Alsharnouby, Alaca, and Chiasson, 2015; Ferrara, 2014; Wright et al., 2014).  
A critical component for thwarting phishing starts with the individual’s diligence and resilience 
to resist clicking on embedded links in email messages and going to unfamiliar websites. End user 
training is considered a key component needed to combat security breaches and phishing attacks and 
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aids to improve overall security knowledge. Ferrara (2014, p. 3) hypothesizes these awareness 
trainings “must be continuous to maximize learning and lengthen retention of learned topics” thus 
improving an individual’s mindfulness. Furthermore, organizations must implement information 
security training and awareness programs (SETA), to ensure employees understand their security 
responsibilities and to increase employee security knowledge. Finally, the SETA programs must be 
dynamic and have ongoing awareness messages that keep employees abreast and refreshed on changes 
in the organization’s information security landscape as an integral part of the security culture 
(Abawajy, 2014). 
Current research from the APWG stated for the last quarter of 2018, 138,328 unique phishing 
web sites and 239,910 unique phishing email (campaigns) exists that indicates phishing is still a major 
threat to organization and individuals alike. Therefore, automated controls, browser warning messages 
and even security awareness training have yet to slow down the advancement of phishing. 
Additionally, studies continue to identify the underlying issues surrounding phishing but fail to 
adequately fix the root cause for phishing, the individual. For example, Hoban et al. (2014) surveyed 
301 non-cybersecurity individuals, collecting 1,062 news articles on computer security and 518 
computer security education documents from universities, companies, and government institutions. 
Their study concluded the information received from participants only “defined the problem for them 
and did not offer any actions they could take to prevent an attack or how they should react to an attack 
that had already occurred” (Hoban, et al, 2014, p. 2). Thus, revealing a gap on how to address phishing 
before, during and after and individual is impacted.  
In another study, performed by Ernst &Young (2013), EY’s Cybersecurity team surveyed 
1,600 assurance, and advisory clients. The results of their survey found that 64% of their clients said 
the level of information security awareness of their employees is the greatest challenge to their 
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organization (van Kessel & Allan, 2013). The E&Y client responses were supported by the research of 
Knezevich (2014), who asserts in their study that 56% of corporate employees had not taken any 
information security awareness training. Subsequently, the lack of security education, training and 
awareness contributes to the increase of successful phishing attacks ranking phishing at 45% the 
second highest concern by decision makers, behind malware from web surfing at 49% (Osterman, 
2015). Research shows the problem with addressing phishing continues to exist with employers 
continuing still have low confidence levels in their implemented security awareness training programs 
ability to train employees to detect phishing (Osterman, 2015; Ponemon Institute, 2016).  
The literature describes an even more sizable proportion of employers have low confidence 
levels in their employee’s ability to resist clicking on links or attachments that appear suspicious and 
embedded in email messages (Osterman, 2015). Still researchers report security incidents and breaches 
continue to be a significant problem, resulting in organizations losing billions of dollars (Ifinedo, 
2014; RSA, 2014). Likewise, Ferrara (2014, p. 3) indicated within the “U.S. economy, 4 out of 10 
organizations still don’t provide any ongoing security education to their staff.” Thus, a reduction in 
phishing attack success rates could mean a significant decrease in the loss of revenue associated with 
this attack as well as reducing one of the top concerns of information technology security decision-
makers (SC Magazine, 2015).  
One must note that the discussion on employee vulnerability to phishing and the weaknesses in 
current prevention methods and SETA programs has focused primarily on employees that function in 
non-security related roles.  In fact, little research has been devoted to the differences between 
employees in security vs. non-security related positions and why non-security employees are most 
often the victims of organizational phishing attacks.  One possible explanation is that security 
professionals possess higher levels of mindfulness. Mindfulness can heighten the individuals state of 
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involvement and wakefulness of being in the present to improve awareness to aid in the detection of 
phishing (Brown and Ryan, 2013). This leads us to the problem statement this research will address. 
 Problem Statement 
While much effort and research has been devoted to identification and preventing the success 
of phishing attacks, it remains a major problem for organizations today. However, little research has 
been conducted on the role of mindfulness as it relates to phishing susceptibility and  the differences 
between cybersecurity and non-cybersecurity employees in relation to mindfulness, resulting in a gap 
in the extant literature.  
 Dissertation Goal 
The goal of this research is to better understand the role that mindfulness plays in a user’s 
detection of a phishing message and to discover if there exists a difference in mindfulness between 
those people whose primary job role is to detect security exploits such as phishing and those that have 
other primary job roles not related to cybersecurity.  
 Research Questions 
1. Is there a statistically significant correlation between mindfulness and phishing susceptibility?  
2. Do cybersecurity professionals differ significantly from non-cybersecurity individuals 
statistically in their mindfulness and phishing susceptibility?  
Relevance and Significance 
Phishing is a worldwide issue that impacts organizations and individuals alike and is a genuine 
threat impacting individual and organizations financially or through disruption of service. We tart with 
the individual’s understanding and general awareness of phishing as a genuine threat to their personal 
and financial well-being. Phishing is not something that impacts a specific group of individuals but 
can be targeted to anyone with a web presence. The phishing problem is worldwide, but research 
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discloses the United States is targeted more than any other country with phishing attacks Ponemon 
Institute and Accenture (2017).  
The addition of another potential variable that can be manipulated to decrease the susceptibility 
of individuals to phishing attacks. If mindfulness does play a role, then we can integrate mindfulness 
training into security training to potentially increase the efficacy of Security Education Training and 
Awareness (SETA) programs. is a reduction in an individual’s phishing susceptibility and the increase 
in mindfulness attention. Researchers identify multiple avenues to thwart phishing attempts (i.e., 
browser warning messages, click rate tracking, polymorphic warning messages, blacking listing 
websites, security awareness training). However, there’s not one single solution that can reduce 
phishing susceptibility. Only through coordination of multiple avenues can phishing identification be 
increased and susceptibility be reduced. It starts with mindfulness that phishing is occurring and 
paying attention to increases detection of phishing cues. Without individual involvement in the 
identification of phishing the landscape will continue to show increases from phishing attacks and 
increases in breaches to organizations and individuals resulting in a potential increase in financial 
losses.  
This study adds to the body of knowledge by looking at the correlation between mindfulness 
and phishing susceptibility the first pairing identified in the literature review. Based on our study we 
identified a gap between cybersecurity professionals and non-cybersecurity individual’s ability to 
identify phishing. Our intent is to close the gap between the groups though various phishing 
identification techniques along with identification of skill trait differences between the two groups. As 
seen in our demographic of the study cybersecurity professionals have a higher degree of education 
and age versus the non-cybersecurity group. This gap in age, knowledge and experience can be 
overcome using layers of defenses against phishing. 
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 Barriers and Issues 
The initial barrier for this study included the recruitment of cybersecurity professionals to 
complete the mindfulness survey. Recruitment took over four months of attending professional 
security chapter meetings, emails, posting to LinkedIn and twitter messaging to achieve an adequate 
population. As for non-cybersecurity individual’s the utilization of college students completed our 
second group. A significant issue between the populations is their cybersecurity knowledge. Typically, 
a cybersecurity professional has at a minimum of a bachelor’s degree, one or more security 
certifications and multiple years of experience in cybersecurity which would also equate to and older 
individual. In contrast, college students are less than 4 years out of high school still perusing their 
bachelor’s degree, younger aged and have less experience or training in cybersecurity  
 Assumptions, Limitations, and Delimitations 
A primary assumption is that every participant in our study has some knowledge of phishing or 
at least has seen a phishing message and are knowledgeable of the impact of phishing. Limitations of 
the study include the groups participating, we were unable to control for either group their knowledge, 
experience, education or age. The only delimitation imposed initially was the selection of 
cybersecurity individuals who were members of a cybersecurity organizations. This group of 
cybersecurity individuals have professional memberships that does not fully represent all cybersecurity 
professionals, thus making generalization somewhat difficult but possible.    
 Definitions of Terms 
Phishing is defined as any email-based social engineering attack by PhishMe (2015).  It can be any 
activity where confidential information such as personal as well as financial information from the user 
is obtained by luring the user towards an illegitimate webpage (Rakesh, Kannan, Muthurajkumar, 
Pandiyaraju, and SaiRamesh, 2014). 
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Ransomware is a type of malware that prevents or limits users from accessing their system. This type 
of malware forces users to pay the ransom through specific online payment methods to grant access to 
their networks or to get their data back (Global Ransomware Resource Center, n.d.). 
Spear Phishing is where an attacker crafts a specific email using personal and behavioral information 
obtained from public sites to lure an individual into clicking on links in the email or navigating to a 
corrupted web page. 
 Summary 
Phishing is a global issue that shows no visible indication of slowing down. Even as 
organizations increase spending on IS tools to detect phishing, these types of attacks continue to rise. 
Meanwhile, the phishing strategy deployed by phishers remains consistent as described by a thirteen-
year longitudinal study. Thus, moving individuals to a cognitive awareness from mindlessness to 
Mindful awareness can have a significant impact on the reduction of phishing susceptibility. However, 
to break the phishing cycle will require a commitment from organization and individuals towards 
improving training habits and frequency. Thus, enabling end users to comprehend phishing techniques 
and provide end users with the willingness to change their behavior to reduce phishing susceptibility. 
The remainder of this dissertation is structured as follows. First, there is a general review of the relevant 
literature that discusses techniques seen that have been tried to educate individuals on the phishing cues 
used by phisher’s and how they are identified and can be manipulated for the phisher’s advantage. 
Included in the literature review will be the theories used to address cognitive behavior and threat 
protection. Next the process for developing the methodology for individual participation and the survey 
instrument. The process will present the results of the quantitative statistical analysis and demographic 
information. Following statistical analysis of the results, the overall study context and design of phishing 
susceptibility will be discussed. Finally, concluding with remarks about the study, any limitations, and 
emphasis on future research in this area. 
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Chapter 2 
 
Review of the Literature 
 
 
 
Introduction 
To answer the question proposed in this dissertation, to better understand the role that 
mindfulness plays in a user’s detection of a phishing message and to discover if there exists a 
difference in mindfulness between those people whose primary job role is to detect security exploits 
such as phishing and those that have other primary job roles. We investigate how mindfulness 
practices can promotion increased awareness of phishing and reduce phishing susceptibility. We begin 
with looking at how phishing continues to hook individual with different variation of their messages 
and how interventions used to thwart such attacks. We include how increasing mindfulness activity 
would increase awareness of existing processes.  
A review of literature looks at research from Anderson et al. (2015) and Proofpoint (2016), 
discuss that phishing continues to work because its techniques rely on human behavior rather than 
exploiting technology. Phishing attacks succeed because phishers cause users to respond to some 
action that is to the advantage of the attacker by tricking the end user to click on a factious website or 
installing malware by appealing to an individuals’ efficacy, urgency and order according to Yates and 
Harris (2015). Phishing attackers use spoofed business or personal email messages to trick individuals 
into going to compromised sites to capture information that can later cause harm to corporations or 
individuals. The overall design of this literature review is to identify techniques available to detect 
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phishing, whether through automated or manuals discovery methods and how mindfulness can assist 
individuals by increasing awareness of methods to reduce phishing  
The Proofpoint (2016), study describes phishing as preying on the personality of its victims by 
attacking the victim’s work ethics. In this study it focused on assessing the risk perception of an 
individual toward phishing that could lead to increased susceptibility. These researchers emphasize 
when a person under-estimate’s risk they increase their potential phishing susceptibility. Additionally, 
the study pointed out attackers are using legitimate but compromised mail servers and innocuous 
language to avoid automated technical defenses. As Figure 1 shows, individuals are the last line of 
defense for protection from phishing. One article reviewed covered risk perceptions of cyber security 
individuals was found in (SC Magazine, 2015). This article covered over a 1,000 Information 
Technology (IT) security decision-makers and practitioners, from organizations with over 500 
employees, where the study found IT individuals had an increased perception of phishing or spear 
phishing attacks from 2014 to 2016. This increase of risk awareness stems from their training and 
awareness of the damage phishing and spear phishing was having on corporations. However, the 
article mentioned low-security education and awareness among employees and individuals could play 
a factor with increasing phishing susceptibility. The authors of the SC Magazine (2015, p. 1) article 
called this low-security knowledge the “greatest inhibitor to defending against cyber threats.” 
 
Figure 1 Phishing Control Matrix 
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To safeguard organization and individuals from phishing measures must include automated 
cues as the first line of defense in combating phishing attacks. Safeguarding measures that anyone can 
employ to assist in the identification of phishing should include; mechanical email filtering, email 
source, grammar and spelling, urgency cues and paying attention to the email title or subject. All these 
cues can be enhanced through an individual’s use of mindfulness by paying closer attention and 
scrutinizing the construction of email messages received. In the study of Liang and Xue (2009), they 
posit that safeguarding measures with the highest perceived avoidance will aid individuals with 
reducing their perceived threat (e.g., threat avoidance) thereby decreasing the likelihood of responding 
to phishing emails. This perceived threat reduction is obtaining when the individual is aware of the 
dangers posed by phishing and plays more attention to its potential impact to the individual or 
corporation. 
In another study, Yates and Harris (2015), describe the method for which individuals filter 
email messages is based on the credibility of the email appearance qualities and judgment regarding 
persuasiveness of the letter to filter whether the email received is legitimate or not. Figure 2 below 
identifies obvious cues found within email messages phishers use to trick individuals into clicking on 
embedded links. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Phishing Attack Cues 
Wright et al. (2014), describes the techniques phishers use in their attempt to trick users 
through email messages, however, no research will be included in this study to identify how 
individuals notice these phishing practices. Accordingly, they, studied 2,624 university students using 
the six phishing influence techniques (i.e., liking, reciprocity, social proof, consistency, authority, and 
scarcity) and found phishing messages that included liking, social proof, and scarcity were the most 
effective in getting non-cyber security individuals to click on the phishing related messages. This type 
of message behavior (i.e., liking, social proof, consistency and scarcity) are similar to several of the 
mindfulness questions of Brown and Ryan (2003), specifically question 7, “I seem to be running on 
automatic without much awareness of what I’m doing”; 8 “I rush through activities without being 
attentive to them”; and 10 “I do jobs or tasks automatically without being aware of what I’m doing” 
thus enabling an increase in the individuals susceptibility to phishing. Therefore, by adding 
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mindfulness to our phishing study the examination should allow for increased employee cognitive 
behavior, increased phishing knowledge and a reduction in phishing susceptibility.  
According to Down, Holbrook and Cranor (2006), their study describes susceptibility to 
phishing as being rooted in an individual’s knowledge and experience used to predict behavioral 
responses to phishing attacks. Furthermore, they found individuals with knowledge of phishing should 
have a significant reduction from falling for a phishing email, clicking a phishing link, visiting a 
phishing website, or entering information into a phishing website. While, other researchers Shillair et 
al. (2015) and Vishwanath et al. (2011), explain phishing studies tend to explore the general decision 
strategies that users adopt to detect phishing. Meanwhile, the technical components used to check for 
phishing are included the research from Akhawe and Felt (2013), Felt, Ainslie, Reeder, Consolvo, 
Thyagaraja, Bettes and Grimes (2015), Herzberg (2009). One technical study, Anderson et al. (2015), 
included the use of polymorphic warnings messages that change formats every time they are evoked as 
an effective method to reduce Habituation, which is fatigue from repeatedly seeing the same browser 
message.  
In the review of the literature the study performed by Burns, Durcikova, and Jenkins (2012) 
described three phishing stages that impact individuals targeted by a phishing as described in Figure 3. 
Initially there is denial, where the employee may not perceive that they could be a target of a phishing 
attempt. Employees at the denial stage are categorized as mindless for not paying attention to the 
potential harm phishing can cause. Second, intention to avoid, has the employee realizing phishing is 
an issue but not performing any specific action to avoid phishing. Finally, at the action stage, the 
employee understands the results, is knowledgeable of vulnerabilities associated with phishing and 
remains mindful to avoid phishing attempts according to Burns, Durcikova, and Jenkins (2012). By 
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adding mindfulness to the phishing stages employees become more aware of phishing and should 
increase their cognitive behavior to allow them to decrease phishing susceptibility.    
 
 
 
Figure 3 Phishing Stages 
A significant postulation seen in the review of literature discusses how attackers create 
phishing messages that are like ordinary everyday email messages yet deceptive in nature. These email 
messages with embedded links can trick individuals into clicking on links sending the user to 
compromised websites where malware and other malicious activity lurks. A significant understanding 
among researchers suggest individuals are the weakest link and have poor judgement when it comes to 
detecting phishing thus increasing susceptibility to phishing (Alsharnouby, Alaca, & Chiasson, 2015). 
Several of the studies on user susceptibility to phishing explored area of neuroscience Anderson et al. 
(2015), and to combat phishing the research covered experimental studies Anderson et al. (2012), eye 
tracking Alsharnouby et al. (2015), breach cause case studies Hovav and Gray (2014), role play 
Downs et al. (2007), online gaming Shillair et al. (2015), phishing influence techniques Wright et al. 
(2014) and browser security warning message effectiveness (Akhawe and Felt, 2013; Felt et al., 2015; 
Herzberg, 2009). Studies show individuals with technical intelligence of web environments, typically 
identified with cybersecurity employees appear to have an increased resistance to phishing as 
described by Alsharnouby et al. (2015) and Downs et al.(2007). This resistance originates from 
employees having implied knowledge and experience with phishing, browser security cues, digital 
certificates, SSL and other security indicators associated with websites. Even knowledgeable 
individuals suffer from habituation, as described by Downs et al. (2007), as the reduction of the 
psychological or behavioral response occurring when a specific stimulus like browser warning 
Denial Intention to 
Avoid 
Action 
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messages occurs repeatedly. The next section of the literature review will briefly discuss the theories 
used to investigate phishing. 
Theoretical Framework  
Studies on phishing susceptibility like any research study strive to strike a balance between 
data accuracy, ethics, and legality to guide the investigational design. The literature review points to 
the research of Hale, Gamble, and Gamble (2015), these researchers hypothesized if phishing emails 
were more complex, they would be harder for individuals to detect, we agree with their assessment 
and believe complex phishing messages would increase phishing susceptibility. In contrast, Yates and 
Harris (2015), performed a longitudinal study that concluded phishing attackers continue to rely on the 
same techniques they have always use to trick individuals because the old methods continue to work. 
However, their study also showed an increase in the use of phishing detection algorithms as a first line 
of defense to detect phishing. Table 1 describes the theory elements illustrated by Hale et al. (2015), in 
their study. 
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Table 1  
Theory elements and sources of theory. 
Theory element Theory Source of theory 
Leakage cues Interpersonal 
Deception 
Theory of 
Deception  
(Buller et al., 1996; Johnson et 
al., 1992) 
Individual prior knowledge Theory of 
Deception 
(Johnson et al., 1992) 
Involvement Elaboration 
Likelihood 
Model 
(Petty et al., 1986) 
Avoidance behavior 
 
 
 
Attitude change 
Technology 
Threat 
Avoidance  
 
Protection 
Motivation 
Theory 
(Arachchilage and Cole, 2011; 
Liang and Xue, 2009, 2010; 
Sun et al., 2016) 
 
(Rogers, 1975; Vishwanath et 
al., 2011) 
 
 The next section of the literature review will briefly discuss specific theories related to the 
research model triad, phishing susceptibility, mindfulness and training efficacy. 
Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM)  
The use of ELM is beneficial for the identification of phishing by focusing on individual 
involvement as part of the theory element. Petty and Cacioppo (1986), study of ELM identified two 
routes to persuasion; central and peripheral routes as described in Table 2. Their analysis implies the 
peripheral route as being unpredictable which relates to being in a mindless state, while the central 
route as more predictable and persistent like being attentive and mindful. Additionally, these 
researchers’ study ponders if training efficacy would enable the systematic cognitive processing of 
information that motivates as a prerequisite to cognitive processing. However, according to 
Vishwanath et al. (2011), their study found during the central process, an individual is being an active 
participant in the process of persuasion and diligently considers the information cues through the 
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process of elaboration. A prerequisite to central processing is the individual’s motivation and ability to 
think about the message and topic (e.g., level of attention).  
In contrast to the central processing the peripheral route describes when an end user agrees 
with the message because the source of the communication appears to be from an expert or is visually 
attractive. One argument places email message from known individual as messages appearing from 
and expert or the potential use of colorful graphics embedded in phishing messages to make them 
more visually appealing. Activate participation assumes the individuals motivated and able to think 
about the communication and its topics according to (Petty and Cacioppo, 1986). According to the 
research of Vishwanath et al. (2011), peripheral information processing occurs because individuals 
make simple inferences about an event based on simple cues such that when the listener decides 
whether to agree with the message based on a different signal (e.g., trust, credibility) beside what is 
being seen in the email message. Petty and Cacioppo (1986, p. 21), explain that “attitude changes that 
result mostly from processing issue-relevant arguments (central route) will show greater temporal 
persistence, greater prediction of behavior, and greater resistance to counter-persuasion than attitude 
changes that result mostly from peripheral cues.”  
According to the research of Petty and Cacioppo (1986), the use of the Elaboration Likelihood 
Model (ELM) is a key model to identify security education, and awareness training. The ELM model 
has been used in other fields of study (e.g., consumer research and marketing) as a method to predict 
attitude changes and can explain the impact online gaming has on security awareness training. ELM 
explains how “predictable long-lasting behavioral changes can be achieved through cognitive 
processing” by ensuring the learning task are personally relevant to the learners (Pukakainen and 
Siponen, 2010 p. 762). Therefore, according to Vishwanath et al. (2011), elaboration describes the 
process through which individuals make conscious connections between what they observe and their 
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prior knowledge this connection fits well with increased mindfulness. Finally, ELM can help security 
awareness training practitioners better understand how and what training methods work, and which 
training methods have a longer cognitive effect increasing training-efficacy. Elaboration has a 
connection to mindfulness through the individual’s conscious behavior, being aware of their current 
surroundings to be able to identify phishing activity as described in Table 2. 
Table 2  
ELM persuasion cues 
Elaboration Likelihood 
Model 
Central Peripheral 
Attitude is a key predictor of 
ELM 
Motivation  Credibility 
Characteristics Authorized sender 
(authenticate looking) 
Typos or Grammar 
Mistakes 
Involvement Individually addressed to 
end user 
Spoofing of legitimate 
sources 
Email load Urgency of message Embedded Hyperlinks 
Knowledge Ability/Penalty Visual appeal 
Computer self-efficacy Justification (incentive or 
threat) to persuade user to 
act.  
 
 
As described in the literature review of Vishwanath et al. (2011), considers the level of 
attention individuals give to specific elements presented in email messages (e.g., source, grammar, 
spelling, urgency cues, and subject line) and the impact they have on elaboration. Similarly, other 
variables impacting email cues include individual involvement and email load, where also variables 
could have a direct effect on the individual’s likelihood of responding to a phishing email. According 
to the research of (Vishwanath et al., 2011, p. 580) cites (Zaichkowsky, 1985), defining personal 
engagement as “the perceived relevance of a particular message or event to an individual.” 
Furthermore, their research had limited explanation on how involvement influences phishing 
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susceptibility, but motivation by the individuals needing to evaluate phishing susceptibility 
consciously. Another area found to impact an individual’s elaboration is email load regarding the 
number of emails received daily. According to Vishwanath et al. (2011), study the number of emails 
received daily reduces an individual’s ability to pay attention to key cue areas in the email message 
thus increasing the individuals’ likelihood of responding to a phishing message.  
Technology Threat Avoidance Theory  
The Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) examines training-efficacy related to 
security awareness training programs and what they teach individuals regarding how to apply filters to 
email messages. Training-efficacy can include self-identification and analysis of email source, 
grammar, spelling, urgency cues, and title or subject characteristics. Our study presents TTAT as a 
theory used to explain IT threat avoidance behavior. Arachchilige and Love (2013), and Arachchilige, 
Love and Beznosov (2016) studies showed cognitive knowledge of perceived threats can impact the 
two antecedents of threat appraisals (e.g., perceived severity and perceived susceptibility).  
This theory’s use is part of the positive feedback loop assisting individuals with avoidance of 
increasing phishing susceptibility. This theory, “explains the process and determinations of IT threat 
avoidance behavior across a broad range of IT threats and user sub-samples” (Liang and Xue, 2009, p. 
77). Liang and Xue (2009), describe the positive feedback loop as individual going through two 
cognitive processes to determine their responses to phishing attempts: threat (primary) appraisal and 
coping (secondary) appraisal. They threat appraisal coping is where users evaluate the potential 
negative consequences of attacks by phishing emails. But it is this threat that individuals develop a 
sense of urgency and become motivated to search for and evaluate information related to coping.  
The literature identifies two types of coping to deal with threats: problem-focused and 
emotion-focused. Problem-focused coping refers to adaptive behaviors that take a problem-solving 
approach to attempt to change objective reality. Problem-focused coping deals directly with the source 
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of a threat by having the individual implement safeguarding measures for self-efficacy. Measures to 
execute self-efficacy can included increased mindfulness and the individual’s willingness to improve 
self-training-efficacy. In contrast, “emotion-focused coping is oriented toward creating a false 
perception of the environment without actually changing it or adjusting one’s desires or importance of 
desires that negative emotions related to threat (e.g., fear and stress) are mitigated” as defined by 
(Liang and Xue, 2009, p. 78). Therefore, adoption of safeguards to protect individuals from phishing 
attack is an integral part of the threat avoidance loop process. To lessen the risk associated with 
phishing susceptibility, individuals need to focus on both problem and emotion-focused coping as seen 
in the study performed by Sommestad, Hallberg, Lundholm, and Bengtsson (2014), which indicates 
that threat appraisal is a good predictor of compliance. Thus, an increase in the individual’s perceived 
threat should increase their emotion-focused coping and problem-focused coping.   
The final theoretical framework developed for phishing susceptibility is the Integrated 
Information Processing Model of Phishing Susceptibility (IIPM), (Vishwanath et al, 2011). This model 
as depicted in Figure 4 below suggests that individuals’ respond to phishing related emails based on 
the content included within the email message, where creation of phishing cues are very persuasive in 
conjunction with email signatures and the knowing the sender address.  
  
Figure 4 Formula for Susceptibility to Influence 
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Within this framework Williams et al. (2017), describes a formula for evaluating the 
possibilities the factors that make up the individual’s susceptibility to influence four-factors. Their 
analysis of the IIPM focused on individual vulnerabilities and how those traits play a part on the 
individual’s contextual level. The message factors may have a greater impact on susceptibility through 
the interaction of existing vulnerabilities. The table can be used to develop a test range of hypothesis. 
For example, the InMech factor included in the Susceptibility to Influence formula takes into 
consideration the known phishing cues used in phishing messages. 
The ‘Who’: Individual traits of the recipient, such as personality and risk-preference 
(TIND); 
The ‘When’: The recipients current state, such as their current mood, degree of self-
awareness, cognitive pressure, or fatigue (StIND); 
The ‘Where’: The context an individual is operating in at the time, such as whether they 
are at home or at work, the communication medium used, and the impact of wider 
cultural values (CIND); 
The ‘What’: The influence mechanism that is used, such as invoking compliance with 
authority, instigating a time pressure or appealing to particular emotions (InMECH)” (p. 
417). 
 
Perceived susceptibility is described as “an individual’s subjective probability that the 
malicious IT will negatively affect him or her, and perceived severity is defined as the extent to which 
an individual perceives that negative consequences caused by the malicious IT are severe” (Lang and 
Xue, 2009, p. 80). Furthermore, the researchers described perceived severity as the extent to which an 
individual perceives that negative consequences caused by malicious IT are severe. Therefore, when 
an individual believes the risk of receiving malicious information is great only then will they be 
motivated to reduce the perceived threat. The identification of Threat appraisal is described in the 
following (e.g., PMT, TRA, and TRM) theories as referenced by (Browne, Lang & Golden, 2015; 
Cheng, Li, Li, Holm & Zhai, 2013; Li, Zhang and Sarathy, 2010; Shilliar et al., 2015).  
Based on the literature review we have adopted the following research model to ascertain user 
Phishing susceptibility.  
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In our model Mindfulness, phishing susceptibility and training efficacy are dependent variable, 
measured by independent variables such as gender, age, race and education. 
Research Model 
 
Figure 5 Research Model 
Table 3 described the research variables used in our assessment of mindfulness and phishing 
susceptibility. 
Table 3  
Research Variables 
Variables Description Reference 
Mindfulness  Is described as a heightened state of involvement 
and wakefulness of being in the present. Training in 
mindfulness included new contexts to increase 
learning. It predicts self-regulated behavior and 
positive emotional states. 
Brown and Ryan (2003); Langer and 
Moldoveanu (2000)  
   
Phishing 
Susceptibility  
Where an individual falls multiple times for 
phishing emails, clicks on a phishing URL or 
provides information on a phishing website. Where 
individuals fail to identify phishing cues (i.e., 
authority, urgency, reciprocity, social proof, 
reward, loss or scarcity) 
Downs et al.(2007); Parrish Jr., Bailey, & 
Courtney (2009);Sheng, Holbrook, 
Kumaraguru, Cranor, & Downs (2010); 
Williams et al.(2018) 
   
Training Efficacy Playing online gaming to increase cognitive 
abilities to identify phishing cues. Individuals 
proactively seeking out training opportunities to 
learn about phishing. General education acquired 
form college or other technical training. 
Canova et al.(2014); Sheng et al. (2010) 
   
Age, gender, 
online gaming 
education  
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Mindfulness 
 The literature identified numerous characterizations of mindfulness that addresses the 
state of being conscious or aware, in the present moment. Two studies Weick and Sutcliffe (2001) and 
Brown and Ryan (2003), were identified in the literature review discussing mindfulness. The study 
performed by Weick an Sutcliffe (2001), focused on organizations becoming high reliability 
organizations or HRO’s. While Brown and Ryan (2003) focused on the individuals mindfulness 
characteristics. Since our study encompassed individuals and not organizations, we used the 15-
question survey designed by Brown and Ryan (2003) to gauge how mindful individuals assess 
themselves using a 6-Point Likert Scale. The questions included in the mindfulness survey are 
presented in Table 4 
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Table 4 
Mindfulness Survey Questions 
Survey Questions  
 
 
1. I could be experiencing some emotion and not be conscious of it until sometime 
later. 
 
2. I break or spill things because of carelessness, not paying attention, or thinking of 
something else. 
 
3. I find it difficult to stay focused on what's happening in the present.  
4. I tend to walk quickly to get where I'm going without paying attention to what I 
experienced along the way. 
 
5. I tend not to notice feelings of physical tension or discomfort until they really grab 
my attention. 
 
6. I forget a person's name almost as soon as I've been told it for the first time.  
7. It seems I am "running on automatic" without much awareness of what I'm doing.  
8. I rush through activities without being attentive to them.  
9. I get so focused on the goal I want to achieve that I lose touch with what I'm doing 
right now to get there. 
 
10. I do jobs or tasks automatically, without being aware of what I'm doing.  
11. I find myself listening to someone with one ear, doing something else at the same 
time. 
 
12. I drive places on 'automatic pilot' and then wonder why I went there.  
13. I find myself preoccupied with the future or the past.  
14. I find myself doing things without paying attention.  
15. I snack without being aware that I'm eating.  
 
Unlike Weick and Sutcliffe (2001), process steps, to gather information from the Brown and 
Ryan (2003), survey participants they are asked to answer the 15 survey questions on a one to six-
point scale. The simplicity of the questions posed by these researchers, approach mindfulness from a 
mindless lenses of survey question to achieve their mindful conclusion. Our review of the literature 
generally found individuals with increased mindfulness should be less susceptible to phishing due to 
their self-awareness versus those individuals who are less mindful. 
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Training Efficacy 
Involvement in the study implied some general understanding (e.g., knowledge and 
experience) with phishing but it was not considered a prerequisite. Enhancing phishing awareness is 
described as a “person who defines Phishing correctly” (Alnajim and Munro, 2009, p. 407). Where 
defining phishing correctly could be the product of formal or self-training, education or experience. A 
key component of increased knowledge is teaching individuals how to identify more than just the 
crucial phishing cues (e.g., typos, grammar spoofed hyperlinks and message urgency) and to find the 
anomalous or deceptive information within a given email message. The literature review identifies 
various training efficacy methods to teach individuals how to identify phishing to reduce phishing 
susceptibility. Examples of training include classroom lecture, online course, and self-taught webinars, 
degrees, and certifications.  
Employers have started sending employees fake phishing e-mails to evaluate user susceptibility 
to phishing and then following up with training (Purkait, 2012). These fake phishing attempts can also 
measure employee improvements towards phishing detection thus decreasing an individual’s phishing 
susceptibility. Other studies from Alnajim and Munro (2009), Alsharnouby et al. (2015), Arachchilage 
and Cole (2011), Arachchilage and Love (2013), Arachchilage et al. (2016) and Hale et al. (2015) 
identify role play and online gaming as prominent training approaches. Role playing provides 
individuals with scenarios to choose from, while online gaming a newer method to highlight 
vulnerabilities without taking individuals to actual phishing websites.  
Alnajim and Munro (2009), covered anti-phishing training approaches which concluded 
individual participants with technical ability in their study showed no increase effect on identification 
of phishing. However, phishing knowledge had a positive impact on phishing web site detection when 
training intervention is utilized. In the role-play experiment Alnajim and Munro (2009), had 36 
participants view email messages and internet addresses to identify which were legitimate and which 
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ones were phishing. The basis for their study included three groups; Control, Old Approach, and New 
Approach groups. During their study, they gave the control group only email from work, while the Old 
Approach received anti-phishing tips sent by email and the New Approach group received anti-
phishing intervening messages. The results of their testing concluded that individuals receiving 
training intervention treatment had a significantly positive effect regarding detection and 
understanding phishing. 
Meanwhile, online gaming studies according to Arachchilage and Cole (2011) and 
Arachchilage and Love (2013), are design to educate users to reduce phishing susceptibility. But 
Downs et al. (2007), shifts attention to the use of role playing to identify individual personality traits 
like gender, existing phishing awareness, email sender familiarity and other personality traits to 
increase phishing detection. A second form of online training gaining popularity is gaming, 
specifically phishing game-based training. This form of training has become a unique way to educate 
individuals, incorporating mobile devices and home computers to deliver training to detect phishing 
attacks (Arachchilage and Cole, 2011). The primary objective for developing anti-phishing mobile 
games is to identify phishing website addresses (URLs), and second to recognize phishing emails by 
analyzing the content of email messages (Arachchilage and Cole, 2011). Phishing online gaming is 
“designed to increase users’ avoidance behavior through motivation to protect against phishing 
attacks” (Arachchilage and Cole, 2011, p. 5).  
Early mobile games design principles contained seven structural elements; roles, goals and 
objectives, outcome and feedback, conflict, competition, challenge, and opposition leading to players’ 
excitement, interaction, and representation or story (Arachchilage and Cole, 2011). However, Hale et 
al. (2015), posit that authenticity, repetition, and data accuracy are equally important game features 
needed when developing a game-platform for phishing. While using the mobile game prototype from 
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MIT App Inventory Emulator, Hale et al. (2015), performed a usability study of the game prototype to 
assess the subjective satisfaction of the mobile game prototype interface. Their pilot study recruited 
eight first-year undergraduate students who took a pre-test, played the mobile game and then a post-
test. The pilot study “revealed that the mobile game was effective in teaching participants to look at 
URLs on their browser’s address bar when assessing a website’s legitimacy” (Hale et al., 2015, p. 
190). Additionally, participants of the study scored 49 percent in the pre-test and increased their 
identification of phishing websites to 78 percent during the post-test after playing the mobile game. 
Because of the difficulty capturing actual individual actions cognitive theorists like Hale et al. (2015), 
posit that behavioral intentions are a strong predictor of actual behavior and the use of the mobile 
game prototype had a significant impact on an individual avoidance motivation.  
E-learning has an advantage over other training mechanisms because it provides instant 
updates, data storage, retrieval and sharing of information and it is delivered via computers using 
standard internet technology (Omar, Abdalrahim, Drewish, Saeedand & Abdalbagi, 2015). 
Furthermore, e-learning follows adult learning theory by helping “adults learn by relating new learning 
to past experience, by linking learning to specific needs, and by practically applying to learn, resulting 
in more effective and efficient learning experiences” (Ruiz et al., 2006, p. 208). Furthermore, their 
research found evidence which suggests “e-learning is more efficient because learners gain 
knowledge, skills, and attitudes faster than through traditional instructor-led method” (Ruiz et al., 
2006, p. 208). Figure 6 identifies the four parts of the e-learning equation as described by (Ruiz et al., 
2006).  
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Figure 6 Components of E-Learning 
Computer-gaming is gaining fast as an instrument to educate individuals, Ruiz et al. (2006), 
they assessed 76 studies including medical, nursing, and dental literature with web-based learning, and 
one-third of the studies revealed knowledge gains. A similar collaborative study conducted by 
Callaghan, McCusker, Losada, Harkin and Wilson (2013), was successful with inclusion of web-based 
and virtual worlds (VM) training for electrical engineering students. Researchers like Arachchilage 
and Cole (2011), are promoting online gaming because it stimulates individuals to pay closer attention 
and it provides immediate feedback. Furthermore, online gaming offers a better and natural learning 
environment, by attracting and keeping individual engaged until the end of the game, while providing 
immediate feedback, unlike reading a book, taking an online class or training in a classroom setting 
(Arachchilage et al., 2016).  
Online gaming as a technique can effectively address data accuracy in phishing awareness, and 
training appears appropriate to affect learning. Meanwhile, the identification of which anti-phishing 
training or education is most effective depends on the training method employed by each employer 
and the learning capacity of everyone. In the study from Arachchilage and Cole (2011), it shows that 
embedded training works better than current security awareness training practices where sending 
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security notices to exist. Arachchilage and Cole (2011), used the online game Anti-Phishing Phil in 
their study to show the effects on participants who played the game were better able to identify fake 
websites. According to (Callaghan et al., 2013, p. 583), online gaming “as a modern technology is 
maturing rapidly and reaching the stage where it is sufficiently robust and reliable for wide-scale 
deployment.” A significant benefit from using online gaming stems from its design and its ability to 
increase users’ avoidance behavior through motivation to protect against phishing attacks according to 
the following authors (Arachchilage and Cole, 2011; Arachchilage and Love, 2013; Arachchilage et 
al., 2016).  
Web-based training materials, contextual training, and embedded training are shown to 
improve users’ ability to avoid phishing attacks (Sheng, Magnien, Ponnurangam, Acquisti, Cranor, 
Hong & Nunge, 2007). Online gaming is as an alternative to computer based training and other online 
training methods. Online gaming design has its roots closely aligned with seminal research associated 
with threat avoidance behavior as found in PMT and TTAT theories. The literature clearly describes 
the key’s to successfully development of online gaming education tools is to ensure that users are 
presented with an increased perceived threat perception which will allow the individual to be 
motivated to avoid phishing attacks and invoke the use of safeguarding measures (Arachhilage et al., 
2016). These researchers designed ten URLs with five good worms and five bad worms to teach users 
how to tell the difference between phishing and non-phishing URLs. A pilot study consisted of eight 
first-year undergraduate students from a Department of Computer Science and Technology, which 
revealed the prototype mobile game was effective in teaching participants to look at URL’s on their 
web browsers to assess the website’s legitimacy. Participants scored 49 percent on the pre-test without 
playing the mobile game and 78 percent on the post-test after playing the mobile game (Arachhilage et 
al., 2016). Within their main study, 20 participants were third-year computer science undergraduates 
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participating in a “think-aloud” experiment to evaluate their understanding of phishing threat 
awareness through the mobile game prototype. This study measured user subjective satisfaction with 
the mobile game prototype interface. Results from their study indicated a 28 percent increase in the 
participants’ phishing avoidance behavior during post-test analysis after playing the online game and 
achieved an average satisfaction score of 83.62% out of 100 on the System Usability Scale (SUS). 
In an example of another online game Anti-Phishing Phil was assessed to educate users on 
phishing (Sheng et al., 2007). This online game educates users on conceptual and procedural 
knowledge needed to identify phishing emails and URLs. Sheng et al. (2007), looked at research from 
learning science for the design needed to establish its interactive environment, specifically related to 
online gaming. Their analysis found online gaming to be one of the most effective training methods. 
During the development of the Anti-Phishing Phil game, Sheng et al. (2007), applied three learning 
science principles: reflection, story-based agent, and conceptual–procedural. The incorporation of 
reflection aids in “the process by which learners are made to stop and think about what they are 
learning (Sheng et al., 2007, p. 90). The researchers cite, studies that show cognitive learning increases 
if educational games include opportunities for learners to reflect on what the individual has learned. 
Story based agents are defined as “characters that help in guiding learners through the learning 
process. These characters represent visually or verbally cartoon-like or real-life characters” (Sheng et 
al., 2007, p. 90). Finally, the conceptual-procedural principle builds on the individuals’ conceptual 
knowledge and procedural knowledge influencing one another in mutually supportive ways and 
creating an iterative process (Sheng et al., 2007). Sheng et al. (2007), research indicated 14 individuals 
were selected to participate in their phishing study to measure the effectiveness of user training. 
Specifically, this study looked at the false positive (e.g., an individual mistakenly judging a legitimate 
32 
 
 
site as a phishing site) and false negative (e.g., when a phishing site is incorrectly identified as a 
legitimate site).  
Overall, according to Sheng et al. (2007), the Anti-Phishing Phil study found a significant 
increase in user confidence levels from 3.72 (variance = 0.09) to 4.42 (variance 0.10) for identifying 
phishing URLs using online gaming. Although online gaming increases user ability to identify URLs 
as phishing two particular problems arose; some users still have issues with phishing domains that are 
like the real ones, and users tend to look less for other clues once they accept the URL as not being 
suspicious (Sheng et al., 2007). 
To further explore the effectiveness of security awareness, Carpenter and Huisman (2016), 
describe security awareness as a broad range of education, communication, and behavior management 
activities, with learning outcomes including; compliance with regulations and policy, supporting 
disciplinary actions, increasing employees’ knowledge concerning threats, risks, and security options 
and changing and maintaining employees’ security behavior. Likewise, (Gartner, 2016, n.p.), describes 
security educations as an “overarching set of activities and objectives that elevates security 
competence and motivates employees to make security decisions for themselves and the organization 
that aligns with enterprise security performance objectives and expectations.”  
The literature describes newer way of providing security education through various 
intermediaries as described in Table 5. Table 5 provides a description of the most popular third-party 
training programs identified in the Carpenter and Huisman (2016), study.  
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Table 5 
Gartner Magic Quadrant for Security Awareness Computer-Based Training 
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Sans L Yes Yes Yes  Yes    
PhishMe L Yes    Yes   Yes 
Wombat L Yes      Yes  
Media Pro L  Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  
Security Innovation L         
Inspired eLearning L  Yes Yes Yes  Yes   
Terranova WW L      Yes Yes  
PhishLine L Yes Yes       
Global Learning Systems L Yes Yes Yes      
The Security Awareness Co. L Yes    Yes    
KnowBe4 C Yes        
Security Mentor V  Yes   Yes    
Digital Defense N  Yes Yes   Yes   
Footnote: L-Leaders, C-Challengers, N-Niche Players, V-Visionaries  
 
Researchers continue to voice concerns that organizations are developing internal security 
education, training, and awareness programs without regard to proper theoretical grounding or 
measuring employee existing knowledge and experience (Pukakainen and Siponen, 2010). These 
researchers posit existing organizational training, must mimic critical awareness training models. 
When an individual decides whether to open an attachment or not, the individuals assess the threat 
associated with opening the attachment (e.g., threat appraisal). Research of the literature describes 
“thinking about the likelihood of the attachment containing a virus or Trojan (vulnerability to danger) 
and about the seriousness of the consequences that may follow if any malicious content bypasses 
automated protections (threat severity)” (Shilliar et al., 2015, p. 200). Furthermore, Safa, Sookhak, 
Solms, Furnell, Ghani, and Herawan (2015), studied Information Security Experts and Information 
Technology Professionals in Malaysian organizations where 215 questionnaires were used for analysis 
comprising of answers based solely on their experience and knowledge.  
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Further review of the literature looked at anti-phishing behavior which refers to ‘choices or 
actions people usually take against phishing in an Internet environment to avoid becoming its victim” 
(Sun et al., 2016 p. 251). As described above there are three behavioral dimensions to anti-phishing 
Sun et al. (2016), Deletion, Confirmation of Action, and Applying or Learning to Protect. These 
researchers they describe “Deletion” behavior as an individual using anti-virus software and applying 
it to anti-phishing scenarios; Confirmation of Action as checking or confirming URL’s and webpage 
content and Applying or Learning to Protect as the regular implementation of security measures such 
as blacklisting and password change, against phishing activities” (Sun et al., 2016,p. 252). A reduction 
in the individual’s susceptibility to phishing the literature maintains coping reasoning must be present. 
Two studies as referenced by Liang and Xue (2009) and (Yates and Harris, 2015), include training end 
users to identify critical cues found in phishing messages. In the thirteen-year study performed by 
Yates and Harris (2015), they found no significant increase between source credibility and the 
peripheral and central characteristics. Their results only significant event was in a negative direction 
where more recent messages showed weaker persuasive elements than messages from the earlier test 
periods. Two assumptions identified in the research according to Yates and Harris (2015), were; 
existing phishing technical controls phishing algorithms are doing a better job of filtering out more 
sophisticated attacks, which is likely, or phishing attacker are still relying on the same techniques that 
they have always used and are not required to innovate their messages to yield better results.  
Technical controls  
Technical controls are identified as another method useful in the reduction of phishing 
susceptibility, these controls include countermeasures like (1) URL blacklisting, (2) browser warnings 
(3) email labeling, (4) web filtering, (5) Single-Sign on, and (6) multi-factor authentication according 
to (Akhawe and Felt, 2013: Hale et al., 2015; Pompon, Walkowski and Boddy, 2018). However, 
Shillair et al. (2015), found protection offered by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) regardless of the 
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amount of automation still requires a significant amount of manual effort from end users. The use of 
up-to-date ISP web browser tools can assist users in making informed security decisions, but these 
browsers according to Alsharnouby et al. (2015), are only partially successful in thwarting phishing 
attacks. One research study indicated that “browser security indicators are misunderstood or ignored 
frequently, and many users have never noticed them” (Downs et al., 2007, p. 6). 
A review of the literature posits individuals appear to have an expectation that their employers 
or ISP are filtering out all phishing attempts. This perception of security is just an illusion according to 
Herzberg (2009), regardless of receiving training to detect phishing attacks or not. With more than 3 
billion emails sent daily tools like spam Assassin (http://spamassassin.apache.org) and DMARC (n.d.), 
Top phishing attacks: Discovery and prevention (n.d.), are being implemented to filter emails and 
prevent spoofing of corporate email addresses to reduce the number of phishing emails that reach end-
users.  
Another alternative method useful in thwarting phishing is URL blacklisting of IP addresses. 
This tactic utilizes web browsers to reduce phishing attacks, however, studies performed by Akhawe 
and Felt (2013) and Hale et al. (2015), show URL blacklisting is less effective since an attacker could 
have an unlimited number of URL addresses within the same domain. Despite that fact, Akhawe and 
Felt (2013), identified that browsers (e.g., Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Internet Explorer) can 
utilize Googles Safe Browsing or Microsoft Smart Screens list to identify malware and phishing 
websites. However, there is also difficulty in using blacklisting due to the number of new phishing 
URLs discovered daily. During 2014, APGW (2014), reported there were 123,741 unique phishing 
attacks word wide occurring on 87,901 unique domain names. Fast forward to 2015 and Proofpoint 
(2016) reported over 900,000 unique phishing websites. Meanwhile, the Webroot 2018 Phishing and 
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Fraud Repot revealed from September 1 to October 31, 2018, 13 of the top 20 fastest growing targets 
for phishing were financial organizations (Pompon et.al., 2018). 
The literature review describes researchers believe that browser security warning messages are 
ineffective as specified by user clickthrough rates in Table 6. However, according to Akhawe and Felt 
(2013), the results seen from their testing of clickthrough rates were 18.0% and 23.2% for Google 
Chrome and Mozilla phishing and malware warning messages. They concluded that clickthrough rates 
do not appear to impact user behavior. As presented below in Table 6, we illustrate the clickthrough 
rates from a study of 25,405,944 warning impressions in Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox 
May/June 2013. According to Akhawe and Felt (2013), “browser security warnings can be effective 
security mechanisms in practice, but their effectiveness varies widely” (n.p.). 
Table 6  
Clickthrough rates 
 Google Chrome Mozilla Firefox 
Click-through Rate: n=25,405,944   
Malware 23.2% 7.2% 
Phishing 18.0% 11.2% 
SSL warnings 70.2% 33% 
Safe browsing list Yes Yes 
 
In contrast to Chrome and Mozilla, Egelman et al. (2008) and Schechter et al. (2007), studied 
Internet Explorer’s warning messages regarding to phishing susceptibility. Of the 59 participants in 
their study, 81% followed the link provided to the suspected phishing website. The study observed 
participant’s receiving a browser warning messages had only a 79% success rate for those heeding the 
warning for them and close the phishing websites. Compared to 13% who saw the passive warning 
messaged and obeyed them according to (Egelman et al.,2008). Furthermore, their study shows 
browser warning manipulations could decrease habituation (e.g., diminishing attention) and increase 
the amount of time participants spend viewing warning messages. These researchers believe that 
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participants did not understand what the warning signs included in browsers wanted them to do, thus, 
they did not think they were at risk. The central cue to understand phishing behavior is to increase risk 
perception. A second explanation why browser warnings fail to work centers on the individual’s belief 
that someone other than themselves is bearing the risk (e.g., Internet Service Provider) by filtering 
email messages. Furthermore, hazard matching is defined as “accurately using warning messaged to 
convey risk, while arousal strength is defined as the perceived urgency of the warning” (Egelman et 
al., 2008, n.p.). In their study they found by using different combinations of icons and text 
participants’ risk perceptions is impacted and when habituation sets in, the increase in arousal strength 
is used to recapture the user’s attention reducing habituation.  
In the Egleman et al. (2008), study they experimented with using a spear phishing attack with 
106 phishing messages sent to participants. Of the messages sent, the click rate was 94 or (89%) of the 
phishing messages. Additionally, they found that Internet Explorer (IE) users had more technical 
experience, were most likely to ignore browser warning messages. In contract, it was the opposite for 
Firefox users where those technically experience users obeyed all warning messages. According to 
Egleman et al. (2008), there study posit that warning messages regardless of the browser should grab 
the user’s attention by interrupting their immediate task and force the user to choose one of the options 
presented in the warning message. Second, effective warning messages must cause attention 
maintenance – grabbing the users’ attention long enough for them to attempt comprehension. Finally, 
the results of their study found a “significant negative correlation was found between participants 
recognizing a warning message and their willingness to completely read it” (Egleman et al., 2008, 
n.p.).Therefore, if a warning message is known a user is significantly less likely to read it entirely so in 
the case of high-risk area warning messages must be designed differently than other less severe 
warnings to increase the likelihood of the message being read. 
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Individuals look to their ISP and Internet browsers for protection from phishing attacks. But 
according to the Akhawe and Felt (2013), their study launched a phishing attack on 30 individuals 
during a role-playing experiment. The experiment included watching how participants interact with the 
security toolbar display passive phishing warning messages. Their research indicated that even with 
the notification of phishing browser warning messages 20 out of the 30 participants were fooled by at 
least one phishing attack. In a second experiment 10 participants performed a task on PayPal and a 
shopping wish list website, the testers injected model phishing warnings into the website, and none of 
the participants fell for the phishing link, requesting them to enter their PayPal credentials. Still, four 
participants incorrectly entered information on the phishing shopping wish list website. Egelman, 
Cranor and Hong (2008), looked at active and passive browser warning messages according, and 
concluded that participants spend more time reading the warning messages, but did not behave any 
differently, demonstrating that warning messages do not correctly align with users’ risk perceptions. 
Additionally, Herzberg (2009), identified three primary browser indicators (e.g., URL and the 
location bar and security icons like the padlock) and posit why individuals fail to appropriately 
identify phishing attacks. Their experimentation found “users often enter their password without 
validating that SSL/TLS is active and that the URL is correct” (Herzberg, 2009, p. 65). Additional 
researchers found where individuals appear overconfident when presented with familiar looking 
websites that they have existing knowledge of, thus spending less time distinguishing whether the 
website is legitimate or not (Alsharnouby et al., 2015). According to Hoban et al. (2014), security 
warning messages only define the problem and do not offer actionable task users can take to prevent 
the current or future occurrences. Because of this absence of action researchers like Shillair et al. 
(2015), posit that careful targeting of security warning messages to the audience based on their 
knowledge level would be beneficial to improving user self-efficacy and personal responsibility.  
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To further evaluate browser security warning messages Schechter, Dhamija, Ozment, and 
Fischer (2007), gave 60 participants fake site-authenticating images and 57 participated got warning-
page attacks. The results of this research disclosed 97% of the participants failed to detect the false 
site-authenticating images. Meanwhile, 30 out of the 57, (53%) who received warning messages 
proceeded to enter password information. The researcher’s analysis found participants paid less 
attention to the warning page and other indicators because the focus of the study was on site-
authenticating images.  
A key learning objective of this section is to teach individuals how to identify phishing emails 
and websites to better prepare individuals with the knowledge and skills to decrease the false positive 
detection rate. In combination with reading warning messages Alsharnouby et al. (2015), performed an 
eye-tracking movements experiment. They sampled 24 college university participants. The individuals 
taking part in the study looked at Areas of Interest (AOI) for websites designed for use in the research 
study to determine eye movement while examining browser content. According to testing performed 
by Alsharnouby et al. (2015), a significant correlation exists between the time participants spent 
looking at the chrome browser and performance scores. Their results, “suggest that the more time 
spent observing chrome, and the chrome AOIs in particular, led to an increased ability to correctly 
assess the legitimacy of websites” (Alsharnouby et al., 2015, p. 77). Furthermore, these researchers’ 
found eye-tracking data shows users irregularly notice changes in information located in the chrome 
browser such as changing URLs and failed to understand the differences even when observed. A key 
outcome according to Alsharnouby et al. (2015), found eye tracking took participants on average 87 
seconds to decide whether a website is real or fake.  
Summary  
The review of literature reveals there is no silver bullet type of training or level of education 
that can provide individuals with the absolute capacity to identify phishing. In general, the use of 
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automated checks to thwart phishing is only the first layer of defense needed to reduce phishing 
susceptibility. In general, the use of grounded theories (i.e., PMT, TTAT, ELM) are vital to understand 
the type of behavior modifications that cognitively influence user avoidance behavior. A specific cue 
requires individuals to have an increase in perceived threats and increased risk to force individuals to 
invoke protection coping strategies. Secondarily, the next layer of defense includes expanding an 
individual’s knowledge of phishing cues (i.e., authority, urgency, reciprocity, social proof, reward, 
loss and scarcity), as described by William, Hinds and Johnson (2018), and through security education 
practices that improve cognition and have a more lasting effect. Modifying browser warning messages 
and educating individuals to identify phishing cues will allow people to ascertain if any phishing 
attacks can be identified if they make it through automated filters. Various phishing education 
practices are in use today (e.g., CBT, role-play, classroom) but online gaming provides the necessary 
mechanisms to improve an individual’s knowledge, experience, and training self-efficacy. The key 
conclusion identified in this research study and linked to other research studies is that individuals need 
to feel threatened by phishing attacks before they will invoke their threat perception to allow 
themselves to avoid threats. Therefore, online gaming modifications to training individuals to detect 
phishing must ensure that individual have increased perceived threat perceptions to trigger the 
necessary safeguards for protection from phishing. 
  
41 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 3 
 
Research Methodology 
 
 
 
Research Design 
To answer the research questions, the following research design was employed to investigate 
whether there is any correlation between mindfulness and phishing susceptibility between cyber and 
non-cybersecurity groups exist. A sample population of cybersecurity and non-cybersecurity 
individuals were studied. Purposive sampling was conducted limiting cybersecurity individuals to 
those with cybersecurity affiliations, education and experience. The cross-sectional survey was 
performed utilizing the Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) quantitative instrument 
developed by Brown and Ryan (2003).The survey questions were used to measure mindfulness and 
phishing susceptibility, and nominal survey responses were gathered to make correlations between 
mindfulness groups.  
The objective of the study was to achieve completion of 150 surveys from cybersecurity 
individuals and 50 from non-cybersecurity individuals. Our survey was provided to the two groups 
using Survey Monkey’s online survey tool to gather data for statistical analysis.  
Research Questions  
The following research questions are relevant to this study of individual mindfulness. 
RQ1: Is there a statistically significant correlation between mindfulness and phishing susceptibility? 
RQ2: Do cybersecurity professionals differ significantly from non-cybersecurity individuals 
statistically in their mindfulness and phishing susceptibility?   
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Data Necessary to Answer the Research Questions  
The data needed to answer the research questions was collected using a survey-based 
instrument as found in the study conducted by (Brown and Ryan, 2003). The author gathered survey 
responses from individuals from two groups, North Central U.S. Cybersecurity practitioners and non-
cybersecurity individuals. Cybersecurity practitioners were selected because that group was shown 
through literature review to be an understudied group. Additionally, the author wanted individuals that 
were not focused on large technical companies as found on the west coast or primarily governmental 
employees associated with the federal government. After announcing the survey at cybersecurity 
chapter meeting over a four-month period the author obtained 121 completed surveys from 
cybersecurity professionals. Additionally, a second survey was created and posted to Survey Monkey 
and obtained 37 non-cybersecurity individuals that completed the survey over a two-week period. All 
surveys received were accurately completed for the Mindfulness section and used in our analysis. 
The online version of Brown and Ryan’s (2003) mindfulness questionnaire was only available 
through use of the Survey Monkey application, answering question online required a response to each 
question before the individual could proceed to the next survey question. A copy of the survey 
questions is available in Appendix B. The MAAS scale measures the dispositional mindfulness range 
describing how participants report their believed level of awareness referenced by each item on a 6-
point Likert scale (1 = “almost always” to 6 = “almost never) where higher scores reflected individuals 
having assessed themselves as being more mindful. 
Instrument Development  
The following section will address the type of instrument developed and methods used to 
provide validity and reliability to the study. Our main instrument is the mindfulness survey developed 
by (Brown and Ryan, 2003). This survey was selected for simplicity of use and the framing of the 
mindless question to elicit a mindful response from participants.  
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Reliability 
Reliability is the degree to which a test consistently measures whatever it is measuring (Gay, Mills and 
Airasian, 2009). Reliability expresses consistency of the scores produced within any research study. 
The reliability of our research study will be assessed for internal consistency, to measure the extent 
which items in a test are like one another in content. Thus, using Cronbach’s Alpha value of .893 
indicates a high degree of internal reliability in our participant responses on our Likert based survey 
instrument. Reliability of the survey instrument does not depend on the instrument’s validity alone. 
Thus, we calculate the Alpha value as another widely used method in research analysis. Typically seen 
in research studies as the estimate of reliability increases, the error rate associated with test scores 
should have the opposite effect and decrease.  
Validity 
Validity is seen as another critical component of any research study because it communicates the 
appropriateness of the selected test being performed. Our study proved validity in several ways, such 
as utilization of the Mindfulness Attention Awareness Scale (MAAS) survey test purposely for self-
identification of mindful behavior. Validity of our survey is based on concurrent validity correlating 
the two sets of responses. The use of a survey for our analysis continues to be a consistent 
methodology because of the survey’s external validity (Steiner et al., 2016). Because the survey 
questions are not biased and are easily replicated to other research studies the output from the survey 
has a legitimate and realistic perspective.  
Population and Sample  
The author initially reached out to various North Central U.S. Cybersecurity practitioners 
through their affiliation with Certified Information Systems Security Professional (CISSP) 
organizations and InfraGard. A total of 1,400 individual were members of the organizations. In the 
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second part of our study the author engaged non-cybersecurity individuals through social media post 
and email communication to elicit their participation.  
Data Collection 
During the data collection phase, the author utilized a web link to the online Survey Monkey 
site, which was sent to participants through email, social platforms, text, hard copy distribution and 
twitter post, where each participants was asked to give informed consent to participate in the study.  
Prior to conducting the study or interacting with participants, the author was required by Nova 
Southeastern University to obtain approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB). CITI training 
was initiated and completed by the author May 2017. Shortly, after IRB approval the survey 
instrument was communicated to potential individuals. Upon gathering individual to complete the 
survey each participant was informed their identity would be kept confidential in accordance with the 
university’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) consent procedure. In addition to, maintaining 
anonymous responses to the survey questions. No explicit harm physically or emotionally would harm 
participants of this study. While their explicit agreement to participate would be identified by 
indicating “yes” on the survey their agreement to participate. The identity of the participants was kept 
confidential and only the college student had their identity disclosed to their professors for the extra 
credit attained for participating in the study.  
Data analysis 
Analysis of data in a causal-comparative study such as this one involves a variety of 
descriptive and inferential statistics. Analysis of demographic such as (Age, Gender, Race and 
Education) were performed utilizing descriptive statistics including mean (i.e., the average 
performance of a group on a measure of some variable), and standard deviation (i.e., the spread of a 
set of scores around the mean). Inferential statistics such as Spearman rho correlation is useful for 
answering research questions associated with Sociology, Medicine and Business and was the right fit 
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for our analysis to determine if there is a statistically significant correlation and Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) for data correlation. The purpose of the investigation was to determine if correlations 
between cyber and non-cybersecurity groups exists. The author used ANOVA test to assess for 
differences between two or more means. A score of 0 explains none of the variability of the response 
data around its mean. A 100% indicates that the model explains all the variability of the response data 
around its mean.  
Step 1 
Was to assess with a Box’s Test of Equality of Covariance matrices of the dependent variables 
are equal across groups. 
Step 2 
 Perform a review of the authorized squared established correlations to ensure that function 1 
contributes to successful classification. Using Wilkes Lambda, this should provide the author with 
statistical significance. For our study, only one function was evaluated and proved significant in the 
groups.  
Step 3 
 The author utilized the cross-validation output in SPSS to review the percentage of originally 
grouped cases that are correctly classified. The researcher should decide if the percentage is large 
enough to be considered correctly classified. With the standardized established authorized discriminate 
function coefficients and structured matrix should also be reviewed to determine viable classification 
of data. Each group of participants completed the online mindfulness survey maintained on Survey 
Monkey.  
Step 1: Build the data set 
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 To perform analysis of the data the researcher used the Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences (SPSS) software to manipulate the collected data. All mindfulness responses were ordinal 
ranging from 1 – 6 and required no normalization.  
Step 2: Run the data in SPSS 
 The second step in our analysis was to tabulate the score for each question to compute the 
mean for each participant of the mindfulness survey. The author produced the total score for the 
subject’s level of mindfulness, this figure became our independent variable in our study and was 
further used in our ANOVA analysis. 
Step3: Analysis of output 
Resource requirements 
The resources the researcher required to conduct this study were gathered online using Survey 
Monkey. A total of 158 participants responded to the mindfulness survey questions. Question asked 
helped to normalized scores for their level of mindfulness on the 15 question from the MAAS survey. 
The data collected made correlations about the level of mindfulness and its relationship to select 
dependent variable research possible. The researcher used Statistical Package for the Social Sciences 
(SPSS) software, commonly used in data analytics, to analyze data for covariance. 
Summary  
 This chapter describes the research methodology for this study, sample methodology 
utilizing random purposive sampling limiting the research to cybersecurity professionals and non-
cybersecurity individuals. The data collection methodology included gathering data through an online 
survey instrument with 15 questions designed by (Brown and Ryan, 2003). Data analysis included a 
variety of descriptive and inferential statistics such as demographic mean and standard deviations. 
While inferential statistics such as Spearman rho and Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) were utilized to 
evaluate for data correlations. 
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Chapter 4 
 
Results from Survey Analysis 
 
 
 
Introduction  
The results from the analysis of the research study are presented in this chapter. The data 
collected by the researcher is described as well as methods used to statistically evaluate the data 
collected. What our data analysis describes is whether there is a relationship between mindfulness, 
phishing susceptibility and training efficacy, based on the Brown and Ryan (2003) mindfulness scale. 
The study concentrated on two groups, cybersecurity practitioners and non-cybersecurity individuals 
and any relationship between the two groups. Demographic data was obtained and is displayed in table 
7 below showing participant age range, gender, education and race. All data in the study is presented 
quantitatively, concluding with a summary of the data results. 
Data Collection  
The author surveyed cybersecurity professionals from three North Central US Information 
Security groups. The researcher targeted the 918 members from the Information System Security 
Association (ISSA), 424 members from the Information Security MBA group, and 454 members from 
North Central US InfraGard. Solicitation of participants occurred over a four-month period with the 
researcher announcing the study during monthly InfraGard, ISSA and Security MBA chapter 
meetings. Follow up reminders were also sent via LinkedIn and Twitter to remind the population of 
the survey participation request. The cybersecurity sample included 119 cybersecurity specialists. A 
second group of non-cybersecurity individuals were included in the study to differentiate cybersecurity 
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versus non-cybersecurity individuals. Our non-cybersecurity sample came from two U.S. college’s and 
comprised 36 students and two professors, giving our study a total sample (n=157). To obtain a better 
picture of the population the respondents were asked additional questions on the survey to assess their 
phishing knowledge and demographic grouping’s such as gender, education, race and age factors as 
described in Table 7.  
Sample Population  
Survey responses were received using Survey Monkey, that captured a final sample of (n=157), 
128 males and 28 female participants, one person failed to indicate gender in their survey response as 
seen in Table 8. The online survey did not have any validation requirements set for responses to 
demographic information. Our analysis identified significant differences in gender based on the initial 
assessments of the cybersecurity group that had 105, 86.8% men and 15, 12.4% women identified. 
Based on researcher observations of the cybersecurity field this difference between men and women is 
a quite common occurrence for this practitioner field of study. However, the researcher found no 
significant differences identified between the non-cybersecurity group with 23 male and 14 female 
participants and the one participant failing to supply their gender.  
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Table 7  
Demographic Statistics 
 Cybersecurity Non-Cybersecurity Total 
Gender    
Male 105 23 128 
Female 15 13 28 
Missing  1 1 
Age    
18-20 0 2 2 
21-29 10 25 35 
30-39 29 7 36 
40-49 35 2 37 
50-59 28 1 29 
60 and above 14  14 
Missing 1 2 3 
Race    
White/Caucasian 104 16 120 
African American 5 11 16 
Asian 0 5 5 
Hispanic 4 1 5 
Multiple Races 0 3 3 
Coloured 6 1 7 
Some other race 1  1 
Education 
   
High School/GED 2 3 3 
Some college no degree 17 22 39 
Associate degree 7 5 12 
Bachelor’s degree 60 6 66 
Graduate degree 34  34 
    
 
Additional significant differences between the two groups were found regarding age and 
education. The statistics show cybersecurity professionals are highly educated with 78% holding 
bachelor and graduate degrees while non-cybersecurity individuals are high school graduates and had 
some college. The age comparison aligned with education where cybersecurity specialist was 
significantly grouped at 88%, at age 30 and above, while the non-cybersecurity individuals had 75% 
between the age of 18 – 29, primarily still attending college or recently graduated. Our final 
comparison looked at race between the two groups and identified white males n = 120 or 76% of the 
sample, dominating both groups and only African Americans from the non-cybersecurity group make 
up 29% were significant. All other race groups were not statistically significant in our study. 
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Education within the cybersecurity group recognized 104 of the 120 participants had a bachelor and a 
significant group had graduate degrees.  
Participants completed the MAAS survey on a 6-point Likert scale from 1 (“almost always”) to 
6 (“almost never”), where higher scores reflected individuals having assessed themselves as being 
more mindful. Participants answered the questions according to what “really reflects” their experience 
rather than what they think their experience should be. Scoring involved calculating mean scores for 
each of the 15 questions as well as each participant's MAAS score across the 15 questions. The MAAS 
scale as showed in the research of Brown and Ryan (2003), measures the dispositional mindfulness 
range describing how participants report their believed level of experience referenced by each item on 
a 6-point Likert scale from 1 “almost always” to 6 “almost never.” Table 4 presents the 15 MAAS 
items included in the MAAS survey. According to the analysis performed by Brown and Ryan (2003), 
they computed a MAAS score (M = 4.20), Standard Deviation (SD = .69), while our initial 
cybersecurity group had a MAAS score (M = 4.15), Standard Deviation (SD = .75) and the non-
cybersecurity group had a MAAS score (M = 4.05), Standard Deviation (SD = 1.47).  
Based on analysis of the research questions the focus of this research is to see if mindfulness correlates 
with phishing susceptibility and if there is a difference between the mindfulness of cybersecurity 
professionals and non-cybersecurity individuals. The next section will detail the results of our analysis 
for each of the measured variables (i.e., Mindfulness and Education) and any interaction effects with 
other nonequivalent dependent variables. The computed reliability statistics for the 15 items from the 
MAAS Survey instrument produced a Cronbach's Alpha of .893, which indicates a high degree of 
internal reliability in our participant responses.  
Initially, we performed testing using Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances to determine 
Homogeneity of Variance, as described in Table 8. Our analysis discovered where F (1, 72) = 1.617, p 
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= .245, partial ƞ2 = .022, observed power = .068. Resulting in a Levene’s computed significant value 
of .072 which is greater than .05, thus the two variances are approximately equal. 
Table 8 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances Mindfulness 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa,b 
 Levene 
Statistic 
df1 df2 Sig. 
MindSc Based on Mean 3.341 1 74 .072 
Based on Median 2.740 1 74 .102 
Based on Median and with 
adjusted df 
2.740 1 70.069 .102 
Based on trimmed mean 3.290 1 74 .074 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent variable is equal across groupsa,b 
a. Dependent variable: MindSc 
b. Design: Intercept + Group 
 
Additionally, we performed a Levene’s Test of Equality of Error ANOVA analysis of the 
dependent variable education, we computed a significant value of .245 which again was greater than 
our p-value of .05, as identified in Table 9.  
Table 9 
Levene’s Test of Equality of Error Variances Mindfulness 
Levene's Test of Equality of Error Variancesa 
Dependent Variable:   MindSc   
F df1 df2 Sig. 
1.375 1 73 .245 
Tests the null hypothesis that the error variance of the dependent 
variable is equal across groupsa 
a. Design: Intercept + Education + Group 
 
Continued analysis between the two groups began with running an Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) to examine the significant mean difference among the two groups on an interval dependent 
variable. We observed in our calculation of the ANOVA an extremely low R-squared value = .097, so 
we elected to run a post-hoc analysis that examined the effect of education as a covariate as described 
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in Table 10. For our test of ANOVA on Mindfulness we selected a random sample of 39 out of the 121 
cybersecurity individuals who completed the Mindfulness survey and 37 of the non-cybersecurity 
individuals to evaluate covariance. To effectively carryout our analysis of the nonequivalent dependent 
variable we initially examined the difference between group means to see if they are statistically 
significant. The Corrected Model Mean scores as reported in Table 10 denotes a Mean Square = 4.535 
and exhibits a statistically significant degree (F = 7.913, p = .006). Examination shows the computed 
P-value .006 < α = .05, thus rejecting the null hypothesis and concluding not all the population Means 
are equal, but some of the means are statistically significant between the cybersecurity and non-
cybersecurity groups.  
Table 10 
ANOVA Mindfulness Score Test of Between Subjects Effects 
Dependent 
Variable: MindSc   
Source 
Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 4.535a 1 4.535 7.913 .006 .097 
Intercept 1212.389 1 1212.389 2115.330 .000 .966 
Group 4.535 1 4.535 7.913 .006 .097 
Error 42.413 74 .573    
Total 1264.085 76     
Corrected Total 46.948 75     
A Computed using alpha = .05 
We performed additional investigation using the ANOVA to reduce our error variance within 
our sample. The examination included a sample of 39 cybersecurity and 36 non-cybersecurity 
individuals for a total population of 75. After performing the ANOVA our analysis ascertained a slight 
error rate reduction, the ANOVA went from 42.413 to 38.399, while the total variance remained 
virtually unaffected. Table 11 describes the ANOVA analysis for the impact of education on reducing 
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the error rate. The resulting ANOVA analysis explains that education did have an effect, a two percent 
impact but not a significant impact on the variation of the data.  
Table 11 
ANOVA Mindfulness Score Test of Between Subjects Effects of Mindfulness 
Dependent Variable:   MindSc   
Source Type III Sum 
of Squares 
df Mean Square F Sig. Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model 4.488a 2 2.244 4.207 .019 .105 
Intercept 52.767 1 52.767 98.940 .000 .579 
Education .862 1 .862 1.617 .208 .022 
Group .087 1 .087 .164 .687 .002 
Error 38.399 72 .533    
Total 1260.085 75     
Corrected Total 42.887 74     
 
To determine the strength of association between Mindfulness and Phishing scores we 
performed analysis using Spearman rho Correlation as described in Table 12. We elected to perform 
the Spearman correlation over Pearson’s r because one of our variables (i.e., Phishing Score) is ordinal 
and the data is not normally distributed. Additionally, Spearman’s correlation was useful for 
answering research questions associated with Sociology, Medicine and Business and was the right fit 
for our analysis to determine statistically significant correlations between mindfulness groups.  
Table 12 
Spearman’s rho Correlation  
 MindSC PhishSC 
Spearman's rho 
 
 
 
 
 
MindSC 
 
 
Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .261 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .118 
N 37 37 
PhishSC 
 
 
Correlation Coefficient .261 1.000 
Sig. (2-tailed) .118 . 
N 37 37 
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Based on the evaluation of our research question whether there is a statistically significant 
correlation between mindfulness and phishing score the significant Spearman correlation coefficient 
value of (rs = .261, n = 37, p > .118) for Mindfulness and Phishing scores both have a “weak” 
association (.20 - .39) according the coefficient guide for the absolute value of rs scale. Therefore, 
indicating that no significant correlation between mindfulness and phishing scores exists.  
Summary of Results 
The objective of this analysis performed was to answer the research questions that allowed the 
researcher to draw conclusions based on the data analysis.  
Statistical results of the research questions. 
RQ1: Is there a statistically significant correlation between mindfulness and phishing 
susceptibility? 
Statistical results of the research questions show’s a computed P-value .006 < α = .05, thus rejecting 
the null hypothesis and concluding not all the population Means are equal, but some of the means are 
statistically significant between the cybersecurity and non-cybersecurity groups. 
RQ2: Do cybersecurity professionals differ significantly from non-cybersecurity individuals 
statistically in their mindfulness and phishing susceptibility?   
 Statistical results of the research questions indicated a slight reduction from 42.413 to was 
38.399, but not significant. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusion, Implications, Recommendations, and Summary 
 
 
Introduction 
The main goal of this study was to better understand the role mindfulness plays in a user’s 
detection of a phishing message and to discover if there exists a difference in mindfulness between 
those individuals whose primary job role is to detect security exploits such as phishing and those that 
have other primary job roles. This chapter begins with a brief discussion of the conclusions reached 
through statistical analysis and interpretation of the data collected in chapter 4. This chapter concludes 
with the implication of the usefulness of incorporating mindfulness into phishing detection and 
recommendations for actions to further incorporate mindfulness into the cybersecurity field.  
Conclusions 
This study focused on the use of mindfulness as an antecedent to measure phishing 
susceptibility between cybersecurity and non-cybersecurity individuals. This study’s creation centered 
on whether there was a correlation between mindfulness and phishing susceptibility among 
cybersecurity and non-cybersecurity individuals. Based on the analysis of the responses to the 
mindfulness survey questions a correlation between the groups appeared imminent. However, having a 
diverse set of factors reduce the noise allowing the researcher to focus on mindfulness. There appeared 
to be no significant differences between the two groups regarding phishing scores thus we posit that 
this is due to becoming familiar with identifying the phishing exploits. Future research should use 
different phishing exploits for testing of phishing susceptibility. However, difference between groups 
were identified based on education, race, gender and age demographic information, thus clearly 
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finding no correlation between groups regarding mindfulness and phishing susceptibility. This study 
focused on two research questions:  
1. Is there a statistically significant correlation between mindfulness and phishing 
susceptibility?  
2. Do cybersecurity professionals differ significantly from non-cybersecurity individuals 
statistically in their mindfulness and phishing susceptibility?  
Initially the researcher sought to identify whether correlations existed between self-reported 
mindfulness scores and how susceptible and individual could be to phishing. The identification of how 
aware an individual might be regarding their surroundings and if that awareness translates into 
lessoning their phishing susceptibility. Secondarily, difference was observed between the 
cybersecurity and non-cybersecurity groups, the effect of our statistical analysis indicates there seems 
to be a relationship between the cybersecurity and non-cybersecurity groups based on their 
mindfulness scores. Utilizing the Brown and Ryan (2003), mindfulness questionnaire, we computed a 
cybersecurity MAAS score of 4.15 and for non-cybersecurity MAAS score of 4.07. Additionally, there 
also seems to be a relationship between a person’s mindfulness and their choice of cybersecurity as a 
career. Therefore, another explanation for the results received in our statistical analysis focusing on 
cybersecurity, education and mindfulness could be explained by the number of individuals within that 
field of study with advanced degrees versus non-cybersecurity where no individuals had advanced 
degrees and a small group had bachelor’s degrees. The analysis related research question 1, might be 
impacted by the fact that most individuals included in our survey had familiarity with the 
characteristics of phishing and, therefore, being mindful is not as significant as other cues associated 
with phishing and cybersecurity.  
57 
 
 
A significant emphasis seen among the cybersecurity practitioners is the necessity of having 
more education to acquire a cybersecurity position. In contrast, the non-cybersecurity group is 
predominately filled with college students perusing their initial bachelor’s degree. Furthermore, there 
is also a significant difference in the age of individuals working in cybersecurity versus individuals 
included in the non-cybersecurity group. Whether the dependent variable is an additional driving 
factors for their education and career, or a result of these factors is something else, that will have to be 
examined in future research. Finally, our choice of instrument may also have an impacted the analysis, 
such that individuals are likely to be more mindful while taking the assessment than they would be in 
an actual workplace setting. Thus, the researcher postulates more investigation is necessary using other 
areas of phishing and cybersecurity to determine the true nature of the relationship (if any) between 
mindfulness and phishing susceptibility. 
Implications 
There are several implications that can be derived from the findings of this dissertation. The 
primary implication identified from the analysis of the data found descriptive data such as 
demographic information as a primary factor for difference between cybersecurity and non-
cybersecurity individuals. Specifically, one must look at the age and education differences between the 
two groups. Almost 90% of the cybersecurity individuals were above the age of 30, while 75% of the 
non-cybersecurity individuals were between the age of 18 – 29. This age difference also equated to the 
difference seen in education between the two groups, 78% having bachelor and graduate degrees for 
cybersecurity individual and only 16% of the non-cybersecurity individual having a bachelor’s degree.  
The research study is different from other studies with the inclusion of mindfulness to measure 
whether correlations exits between cybersecurity and non-cybersecurity individuals. Specifically, the 
research targeted individuals who are information security practitioners and belong or participate in a 
professional information security group. The inclusion of mindfulness suggests that more mindful 
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individuals are more aware of their surroundings and have increase cognitive capabilities. Therefore, 
by having increased cognitive skills, the information security practitioners would be less susceptible to 
phishing. Broadening implications associated with this study, include contributions to the body of 
knowledge by using mindfulness as a measure between cybersecurity and non-cybersecurity groups.   
Recommendations for Future Research 
Based on the analysis derived from the study the researcher recommends using mindfulness as 
a basis to gauge participant awareness and inclusion of additional survey questions about phishing to 
explore the individual understanding of phishing techniques and how to detect them. Future research 
should identify if individuals with higher mindfulness scores had higher education, received on the job 
training for phishing and at what level, and finally identify what drove them to work within 
cybersecurity. Based on the quantitative results of the research study adding additional online game 
training is critical to advance the cognitive understanding of how to reduce phishing susceptibility 
among all groups. With improved education and awareness, individuals will become armed with 
additional detection techniques, beneficial to both corporations and the individual to detect phishing 
attacks that by-passes automated detection mechanisms.  
Finally, the researcher also sees the necessity for having larger sample sizes included in the 
research to improve the analysis obtained to better identify correlations between groups and their self-
assessment for mindfulness.  
Future studies should also combine the use of manipulation of browser security warning 
message morphing with online game training to assess whether the automated manipulated messages 
coupled with online game training improves cognitive functions to identify phishing cues. 
Furthermore, future studies should incorporate automated browser warning messages as an additional 
factor to assess URL appropriateness by allowing participants to see the URL, invoke the warning and 
then see if online gaming training will aid as an additional filter to increase phishing identification. 
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Another avenue for future studies should make comparisons of online game training results between 
cybersecurity and non-cybersecurity groups. In addition to, requiring feedback from participants and 
providing immediate feedback on their responses to phishing could also increase coping behavior. 
Additionally, future studies should also focus on measuring the effectiveness of corporate online 
phishing education as well as concentrating on incorporating employee pre-existing knowledge and 
experiences with phishing into security awareness training. 
Summary 
The research study is a closed questionnaire that used a Likert scale to gather responses from 
participants regarding self-identification of mindfulness. The research study includes two groups 
addressing the 15-questions as described in the MAAS questionnaire developed by (Brown and Ryan, 
2003). The sample selected came from a pool of cybersecurity practitioners from North Central US 
who were also members of a local information security groups (e.g., ISSA, InfraGard or another 
security group). Through the mindfulness questioning of the research study, a sample of 121 
cybersecurity practitioners completed the 15 MAAS survey questions to assess their level of 
mindfulness. The second sample was selected from a pool of non-cybersecurity individuals and the 
same MAAS 15 mindfulness questionnaire was administered. Within the second sample group only 38 
completed MAAS questionnaires were obtained.  
The goal of this research is to better understand the role that mindfulness plays in a user’s 
detection of a phishing message and to discover if there exists a difference in mindfulness between 
those people whose primary job role is to detect security exploits such as phishing and those that have 
other primary job roles.  
The modification of employee cognitive behavior assists with coping strategies and avoidance 
of increased phishing susceptibility. With continued phishing attacks against corporations and 
individuals, organizations need to strike a balance between automated and manual detection programs 
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that assist in the reduction of risk from phishing. Globally, the number of identified phishing attempts 
does not appear as slowing down and continues to rise year over year thus prompting organizations 
and individuals to take steps to protect themselves. Additionally, despite increased spending on 
technological advancements, phishing remains a top attack vector costing corporations billions of 
dollars in damages. Notwithstanding, the use of automated detection and preventive controls, 
researcher still classify individuals as the weakest link (Alsharnouby et al., 2015). Therefore, the 
problem seen with phishing can be correlated with end-user cognitive behavior.  
A review of the literature cites multiple occasions where phishing attacks were successful; the 
U.S. Internal Revenue Service and The National Bank of Blacksburg to name a couple of incidents. 
During the IRS attack, taxpayers’ refunds vanished without a trace. Meanwhile, The National Bank of 
Blacksburg attack lost more than $569,000. Furthermore, RSA Monthly Online Fraud Report (2014), 
reported 450,000 phishing attacks, resulting in over $5.9 billion in losses during 2013. Lastly, 
InfoWorld reported seeing 6.3 million phishing emails during the first quarter of 2016. Phishing is and 
continues to be a growing problem such that the Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) saw an 
average of 70,000 phishing sites popping up monthly during the first three quarters of 2015. Due to the 
continued proliferation of phishing emails and URL’s combined with the current overabundance of 
daily email messages a strain has appeared for corporations and individuals to identify legitimate 
versus nonlegitimate email messages. To emphasize the significance of the problem the research on 
phishing also shows individuals receive limited instruction on how to prevent or identify phishing 
even after participating in corporate information security awareness training.  
Research theorist studies point to an individual’s perception of phishing being rooted in their 
existing knowledge and experience that is usable for predicting behavioral responses to phishing 
attacks (Down et al., 2007). Specifically, having technical knowledge of web environments could 
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increase the individual’s resistance to phishing attempts (Alsharnouby et al., 2015). A review of the 
literature states that when individuals know more about phishing, they significantly reduced their 
likelihood of falling for phishing (Downs et al., 2007). However, the authors of the SC Magazine 
(2015), called this low-security knowledge the “greatest inhibitor to defending against cyber threats” 
(p. 1). With the proliferation of phishing attacks, multiple research studies explored ways to address 
how corporations and individuals can reduce the phishing attack surfaces. Studies seen in the literature 
review include; general decision strategies, online gaming design, technical browser security warning 
messages, polymorphic warnings, and enhanced security awareness messaging. 
As awareness increases personal awareness and taking ownership after falling for phishing 
attempts must resonate with individuals, but the research excludes any specific analysis on 
consequence upon falling for a phishing attack. When individuals lack attention it may contribute to 
their over-reliance on organizational automated information security tools to detect phishing attempts. 
Regardless, corporation’s exhibit positions of having a low confidence level toward successfully 
recognizing phishing through automation (Proofpoint, 2016). 
Part of the research study included addressing how individuals react to being phished. The 
three phases of phishing that organizations can implement as part of their awareness training 
components include; denial, attention to avoid and action. Adaption of these phases can help move 
individuals from mindless to mindful and can improve cognitive behavior to reduce phishing 
susceptibility. Corporation and individuals must understand that phishing has no boundaries, it’s a 
global problem impacting all industrialized countries resulting in billions of losses. Multiple types of 
phishing attacks exist (e.g., Vishing, Smishing, Spear-Phishing, Whaling, etc.) succeed because 
phishers cause users to respond to some action that is to the advantage of the attacker by tricking the 
end user into clicking on a fictitious website or installing malware by appealing to an individuals’ 
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efficacy, urgency and order. Therefore, beyond the use of automated controls to detect phishing 
individual must realize they are the last line of defense and arm themselves with the best information 
to safeguard corporate and their personal assets. 
Research studies have identified various automated methods to address phishing, starting with 
the Internet Service Provider (ISP) who provides mechanical security detection technology. Additional 
studies found that discuss combating phishing include browser morphing, browser alerting, eye 
tracking movement, and security awareness training. Meanwhile, technical countermeasures include 
blacklist filtering, user interface assistance, and taking down and blocking known phishing sites. 
However, none of the automated or technical controls alone can thwart every phishing attack. Best 
practices conclude, obtaining security awareness training plays a vital part in the individual’s ability to 
gain the knowledge needed to identify and protect themselves from phishing. Gartner performed 
analysis of phishing-related training providers and ranked the providers into four magic quadrants 
(e.g., Leaders, Niche Players, Visionaries and Challengers) that can assist corporations with setting up 
and establishing a robust security awareness program. Recent research studies are promoting online 
gaming as a critical component to administer training because it motivates individuals to play closer 
attention and provides immediate feedback. Online gaming matches the primary learning objective of 
this research by teaching individual’s how to identify phishing. Specifically, the researcher used online 
gaming as a vehicle to increase the users’ avoidance behavior through motivation to protect against 
phishing attacks.  
Theories associated with phishing and technical elements included in this research study center 
on the ELM Model, it explains how predictable long-lasting behavior changes are achievable through 
cognitive processing (Pukakainen and Siponen, 2010). The researcher selected the Elaboration 
Likelihood Model (ELM) and Technology Threat Avoidance Theory (TTAT) components to model 
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individual behavior. The central persuasion and peripheral routes component of ELM address the 
active participants process of persuasion and diligently looks at information cues through the process 
of elaboration (Vishwanath et al., 2011). The researcher recognizes active participation to be 
synonymous with being mindful. The selection of ELM is a perfect fit given the specific elements 
presented that target an individual’s knowledge, experience and education can also aid in identification 
of known phishing cues (e.g., automated email filtering, email source, grammar, spelling, urgency 
cues and paying attention to the email title or subject) that impact phishing attacks. 
Furthermore, in the review of the literature, the studies show increasing awareness knowledge, 
and sensitivity training reduces an individual’s phishing susceptibility (Vishwanath et al., 2011). The 
research also incorporates TTAT theory to support analysis to address how individuals cope with 
phishing after a successful attack. This theory according to Liang and Xue (2009), helps illustrates that 
users need motivation to avoid malicious actors when they perceive the threat is real and believe that 
the danger is unavoidable, only then will individuals take safeguards to engage in emotion and focused 
coping. Additionally, the literature explicitly shows that adoption of safeguards to protect individuals 
from phishing attacks is an essential part of the threat avoidance process. The use of Internet self-
efficacy constructed survey questions allowed the researcher to examine the individual’s online 
behavior. According to the research of Sun et al. (2016), study, review of the Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) statistic reveals a significant correlation exist between Internet self-efficacy, anti-phishing 
self-efficacy, and anti-phishing behavior. The Sun et al. (2016), study concluded that individuals with 
higher rates of success and accuracy with Internet-related task are more willing to participate in online 
learning.  
Based on the review of the literature and examination of this studies results the researcher 
concludes there is not one technical control or training regimen that can provide corporations and 
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individuals with complete enhanced abilities to detect phishing attacks. It will continue to take layers 
of defense to thwart phishing attacks. Secondarily, grounded theories (i.e., TTAT and ELM) are vital 
to understand the type of behavioral modifications that cognitively influence user avoidance behavior. 
Research studies show that when individuals have an increase in perceived threats and increased risk, 
it forces individuals to invoke protection coping strategies. Improvements in the human layer of 
defense must grow as part of the individual’s knowledge of phishing cues through improved security 
education practices that increase cognition and have a more lasting effect. Modifying browser warning 
messages and educating individuals to identify phishing URLs and email message will allow for 
increased knowledge improving the human firewalls ability to detect phishing attacks that make it 
through the first line of defense automated filters. Finally, the literature review addresses various 
phishing education practices in use today (e.g., CBT, role-play, classroom, etc.) however, online 
gaming appears to provide the necessary mechanisms to improve an individual’s knowledge, 
experience, and self-efficacy and have a longer lasting effect. 
The key conclusion identified in this research study and linked to other research studies is that 
individuals need to feel threatened by phishing attacks before they will invoke their threat perception 
to allow themselves to avoid threats. Therefore, online gaming modifications to training individuals to 
detect phishing must ensure that individual have increased perceived threat perceptions to trigger the 
necessary safeguards for protection from phishing. 
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Survey Instruments 
 
Survey Monkey Quiz Questions 
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Appendix B 
 
Sample Invitation to Participate in Dissertation Study 
 
Adult/General Informed Consent (Rev. 9/20/2011) 
 
 
 
Consent Form for Participation in the Research Study Entitled  
 
Assessing Mindfulness of Bank Employees in Response to Phishing: Improving Awareness 
and Attention Cognition 
 
Funding Source: None. 
 
IRB protocol #:  
 
Principal investigator(s)    Co-investigator(s) 
Chris Wilder, MBA, BS IT, BS Accounting James L. Parrish, Jr., PhD 
6490 Hilliard Drive  Associate Professor and Chair 
Canal Winchester, OH 43110  Department of Information Systems and 
Cybersecurity 
(614) 419-7510  College of Engineering and Computing 
   3301 College Avenue 
  Fort Lauderdale, Florida 33314 
 (954) 262-2043 
 
For questions/concerns about your research rights, contact: 
Human Research Oversight Board (Institutional Review Board or IRB)  
Nova Southeastern University 
(954) 262-5369/Toll Free: 866-499-0790 
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IRB@nsu.nova.edu 
 
What is the study about?  
This study will assess how aware employees are to be able to find phishing attempts seen through a 
review of email addresses and URLs. The purpose of the study is to supply education to employees 
that will allow them to be more mindful of phishing emails or URLs ad better sustain knowledge 
gained from game-based training. 
  
Why are you asking me? 
The reason for asking the subject to take part is to assess whether existing training is enough for 
employees to identify phishing attempts or whether inclusion of mindfulness into the users. Study will 
aid in further identification of phishing emails or URL questions.  Approximately 100 – 150 individuals 
will be asked to take part in the initial survey and grouping will occur to pare down to a smaller group 
of individuals selected based on their knowledge or lack thereof of phishing. This smaller group of 20 
– 30 individuals will complete the think a-loud part of the assessments. 
 
What will I be doing if I agree to be in the study? 
The research study includes four phases; 
 
Phase 1 – All employees will have an opportunity to complete the SurveyMonkey.com survey 
questions to gage how mindful you are. A second part of the survey will gather generic demographic 
information and the final part of the survey will at your awareness of phishing. 
 
Phase 2 – Will pre-test a select group of employees to see how well they find phishing email and 
URLs 
 
Phase 3 – Will the select group of individuals will be given game-based training on how to find 
phishing emails and URLs. 
 
Phase 4 – will administer a post-test to measure improvements in cognition and phishing 
identification. 
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Overall the research should take no more than 1 hour using a combination of online survey and 
classroom observation. 
 
Is there any audio or video recording? 
This section should include information related to audio or video recording if it applies to the project 
proposed.  If there is audio and/or video recording, please include the following paragraph: 
 
This research project may include audio and/or video recording of participants playing the phishing 
game.  This audio and/or video recording will be available from the researcher, to IRB, and the 
dissertation chair or committee.  The recording will be transcribed by (BE SPECIFIC, including “The 
recording will not be transcribed.” if no transcription will take place).  The recording will be kept 
securely (SPECIFY WHERE AND HOW).  The recording will be kept for 12 months and destroyed 
after that time by wiping the DVD.  Because your voice (or your image and your voice) will be 
potentially identifiable by anyone who hears (or hears and sees) the recording, your confidentiality for 
things you say (or do) on the recording cannot be guaranteed although the researcher will try to limit 
access to the tape as described in this paragraph. 
 
Audio/video recording will only ask the participant to explain why a certain answer was selected 
during game-training. 
 
What are the dangers to me? 
The procedures or activities in this study may have unknown or unforeseeable risks (e.g., anxiety) 
and the researcher will make every effort to make the participants comfortable during the process. 
 
If you have any questions about the research, your research rights, or have a research-related injury, 
please contact Chris Wilder and James Parrish Jr., PhD.  You may also contact the IRB at the 
numbers indicated above with questions as to your research rights.  
 
Are there any benefits for taking part in this research study? 
Yes, the primary benefit is to introduce an online gaming training method to employees that will have 
a significant increase on phishing cognition and recognition into the future.  
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Will I get paid for being in the study?  Will it cost me anything? 
There are no costs to you, or payments made for participating in this study. 
How will you keep my information private? 
To ensure confidentiality all participants will be assigned individual numbers by their employer and 
only the employer will know the names of each participant. NOVA’s IRB process requires a minimum 
of 36 months from the conclusion of the study. All information obtained in this study is strictly 
confidential unless disclosure is required by law.   
What if I do not want to participate or I want to leave the study? 
You have the right to leave this study at any time or refuse to participate. If you do decide to leave or 
you decide not to participate, you will not experience any penalty or loss of services you have a right 
to receive.  If you choose to withdraw, any information collected about you before the date you leave 
the study will be kept in the research records for 36 months from the conclusion of the study and may 
be used as a part of the research. 
If the participant may request that his/her data not be used, then it should read: 
You have the right to leave this study at any time or refuse to participate. If you do decide to leave or 
you decide not to participate, you will not experience any penalty or loss of services you have a right 
to receive.  If you choose to withdraw, any information collected about you before the date you leave 
the study will be kept in the research records for 36 months from the conclusion of the study, but you 
may request that it not be used. 
Other Considerations: 
If significant added information relating to the study becomes available, which may relate to your 
willingness to continue to participate, this information will be provided to you by the investigators. 
Voluntary Consent by Participant: 
By signing below, you indicate that 
• this study has been explained to you 
• you have read this document, or it has been read to you 
• your questions about this research study have been answered 
• you have been told that you may ask the researchers any study related questions in the future 
or contact them in the event of a research-related injury 
• you have been told that you may ask Institutional Review Board (IRB) personnel questions 
about your study rights 
• you are entitled to a copy of this form after you have read and signed it 
• you voluntarily agree to participate in the study entitled Assessing Mindfulness of Bank 
Employees in Response to Phishing: Improving Awareness and Attention Cognition  
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